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Abstract 
 The purpose of this thesis is to examine how private prisons, justice reinvestment, 
and public safety realignment are currently being implemented in the United States to 
lessen the economic impact of incarceration and determine which, if any, would work 
best in Mississippi. Several methods were used in this study, including a comparison of 
operational costs between state and private prisons, regression analysis to test the effect 
of Drug Courts on drug-related admissions, and an investigation on capacity levels in 
county, state, and private prisons. The conclusions drawn from this study demonstrate the 
pros and cons of private prisons currently operating in Mississippi, the benefits of Drug 
Courts as a cost-saving mechanism, and how realigning state-level prisoners into county 
facilities is not a viable option in this state. 
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I. Introduction 
!
 The United States, while containing a mere 5% of the world’s population, holds over 
a quarter of its prisoners . With an inmate population far higher than any other country in 1
the world, some have begun to question the functionality of the US imprisonment system. 
The high costs of incarceration and recent epidemic of overpopulated prisons has led 
many states to examine alternatives to correctional development. 
State and Federal Prison Admissions in the United States (1980-2010)  2
!1
 For Immediate Release: How to Safely Reduce Prison Populations and Support People Returning to Their 1
Communities June 2010. Justice Policy Institute, 2010.
 Source: Prisoners in 2012 - Advance Counts. By E. Ann Carson and Daniela Golinelli. United States 2
Department of Justice. Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2013.
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 According to a study performed by the Center for Economic and Policy Research on 
the budgetary cost of incarceration, the combined state-level corrections expenditure in 
the US went from an estimated $8 billion to almost $26 billion between 1982 and 1992 . 3
In the early 1990s, some states began “outsourcing” inmates to private companies in 
order to deal with overpopulation and save on the staggering costs of incarceration. Those 
advocating the use of private prisons suggest several economic advantages over state and 
federal competition. First, private prison proponents argue that these corporations can 
build prisons quicker and cheaper than the government and can choose to locate their 
facilities in states where prisoners can be held at the least expense . Those in favor of 4
such development also argue that private prisons are subject to less bureaucracy than 
public prisons, and are thus not subject to strict hiring procedures . Thus, some argue, 5
private prisons can lower the cost of incarceration and save taxpayers money, making it 
an attractive solution to dealing with the troubling costs and limited capacity of federal 
and state imprisonment. 
 On the other side, those against private prisons claim such operations both violate the 
integrity of the justice system and provide no real cost savings. These individuals argue 
that the privatized correctional system has led to deteriorating facilities and neglected 
prisoners, while generating large profits for private prison companies and their 
!2
 Schmitt, John, Kris Warner, and Sarika Gupta. The High Budgetary Cost of Incarceration. Rep. Center for 3
Economic and Policy Research, June 2010.
 Antonuccio, Rachel. "Prisons for Profit: Do the Social and Political Problems Have a Legal Solution?" The 4
Journal of Corporation Law: University of Iowa College of Law 33.2 (2008).
 Ibid.5
executives. Studies from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)  and the Justice 6
Policy Institute (JPI)  address these issues and also question the actual cost savings of 7
such practices. These reports also bring up the questionable incentives politicians may 
have to promote private prisons and how lobbying efforts along with campaign 
contributions from the largest private prison corporations such as Geo Group and 
Correctional Corporation of America (CCA) have been used to support the multibillion 
dollar industry driven by mass incarceration. 
 The recent backlash from advocacy groups such as the ACLU and JPI has led some 
states to abandon this strategy and take an alternative approach known as “justice 
reinvestment”. Led by a national non-profit organization known as the Council of State 
Governments Justice Center, this data-driven approach seeks to reduce corrections 
spending and reinvest savings in strategies that can decrease crime and strengthen 
neighborhoods . Using this approach, states like Texas have funded treatment and 8
diversion programs in order to lower recidivism rates and subsequently lower the 
population of prisoners in their states. For instance, in Texas, policymakers reinvested 
$241 million on what would have been used on constructing new prisons, saving the state 
$210.5 million in the 2008-2009 fiscal biennium . Recent trends showing a decline in 9
prisoner population in states that have chosen to implement a justice reinvestment 
!3
 Shapiro, David. Banking on Bondage: Private Prisons and Mass Incarceration. Rep. New York: American 6
Civil Liberties Union, 2011.
 Ashton, Paul. "Gaming the System: How the Political Strategies of Private Prison Companies Promote 7
Ineffective Incarceration Policies." Justice Policy Institute. Justice Policy Institute, June 2011.
 "About the Justice Center." CSG Justice Center. N.p., n.d. Web.8
 Justice Reinvestment State Brief: Texas. Rep. New York: Council of State Governments Justice Center, 2007.9
approach make this a viable option for states looking to reduce their prison population 
and save taxpayers money, while also improving the lives of their citizens.  
 Alternatively, states like California have chosen what they call Public Safety 
Realignment in order to deal with rising inmate population and prison overcrowding. 
This approach is meant to limit the number of low-risk offenders being put in prison and 
increase community supervision in order to lower the California state prison population, 
while maintaining a high standard of public safety. However, in order for this approach to 
be possible there must be sufficient space in county-level facilities for the low-risk 
inmates to be housed, making this option not possible for many states. The recent success 
California has had using this strategy has led other states to consider Public Safety 
Realignment as an option for dealing with overcrowded state prisons. 
 The goal of this paper is to investigate the advantages and disadvantages of private 
prisons in the United States, while also considering the potential economic impact of 
taking a justice reinvestment and public safety realignment approach to dealing with 
overpopulated prisons in the this country. I will examine current justice and corrections 
policy in Mississippi and conduct an independent analysis of the economic impact 
incarceration has in this state, while also looking at how current and past budgets are used 
to fund this system. Next, I will look at the costs of private prisons and determine 
whether or not they can be used as a way to save money in Mississippi. After looking at 
private prisons, I will examine the positives and negatives of taking a justice reinvestment 
approach by looking specifically at Drug Courts as a place to reinvest correction funds. 
Lastly, I will explain why realignment will not work in Mississippi, and determine what 
!4
direction makes most sense for this state in order to increase the state’s budget, save 
taxpayers money, and allocate resources to other important areas such as education and 
public health, while keeping public safety as a top priority.  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II. Economic Advantages of Private Prisons 
!
a. Cost Savings 
 As with any other corporation, those in the prison industry aim to maximize profits 
in order to satisfy the duty to their shareholders and like others, do this by minimizing 
costs. One advantage of private prisons is a lower initial cost of development.  The prison 
industry requires large fixed costs, the majority of which come from the construction of 
the prison itself and the cost of land. Because of this, the prison industry generates a large 
economy of scale, resulting in rapidly declining fixed costs per unit of output. Also, while 
most state or federal governments take an average of two and a half years to build a 
prison, private prison corporations are often able to build a prison in less than eighteen 
months, saving firms an average of thirty percent on construction costs alone . Private 10
firms are also not subject to the heavily regulated construction contracts as are 
government funded prison operations, making this process faster and more cost-efficient. 
 Another major cost in the development process is the cost of land. While government 
funded and operated prisons are required to house inmates within state boundaries, 
private firms are not required to uphold this obligation. Thus, private prison firms 
construct facilities in states with low land costs. Currently, five states (Arizona, 
Kentucky, Colorado, Oklahoma, and Mississippi) allow private prison corporations to 
!6
 Moore, Adrian T. Private Prisons: Quality Corrections at a Lower Cost. Rep. no. 240. Reason Public Policy 10
Institute, n.d. 
build prisons and house inmates from other states . The private firms, despite increasing 11
the cost of transportation to bus these prisoners across the country, are not burdened by 
the extremely high land prices in states such as California. 
 However, the main way private prison corporations save on costs is through 
operations, which account for an estimated 75-85% of the total cost of a prison . Private 12
prison companies, driven by cost-saving initiatives, design their facilities so that they can 
operate with fewer personnel. A cost comparison between public and private prisons in 
Wisconsin shows two prisons with a comparable number of inmates operating with 
noticeably different levels of correctional officers and staff. The private prison, operating 
with less staff, reduced the cost per prisoner by almost $10/day, saving the company 
almost $5 million in one year . Private firms also reduce the misuse of overtime in order 13
to reduce the cost of operations. In 2005, correctional officers made approximately $280 
million in overtime pay, with one guard in California taking in an estimated $187,000 in 
salary . Private firms can take away overtime pay given to their employees, allowing 14
them to operate more efficiently and at a lower cost. 
!
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 Eidelson, Josh. "Humans Shipped Across the Country: How America Exports Inmates to Private Prisons." 11
Salon 22 Nov. 2013: n. pag. Web.
 Moore, Adrian T. Private Prisons: Quality Corrections at a Lower Cost.12
 Ibid.13
 Miller, David W. The Drain of Public Prison Systems and the Role of Privatization: An Analysis of State 14
Correctional Systems. Rep. N.p.: ProQuest Discovery Guides, 2010.
b.  Higher Quality 
 With an incentive to cut costs, one might initially think the quality of private prisons 
would be lower than state or federal funded operations. However, some studies show that 
the quality of confinement based on security, safety, order, care, activity, justice, 
conditions, and management is actually higher in private prisons in comparison to both 
state and federally operated prisons . 15
 While private prison companies compete on lower costs, they also must uphold a 
solid reputation in order to be considered for both state and federal contracts. This 
generates some degree of competition, which then creates an incentive to increase quality 
while maintaining low costs. Also, private prison corporations are financially motivated 
to reduce the possibility of assaults, riots, etc. from happening under their supervision. 
Recent lawsuits  resulting from inmate assaults and disturbances give private prison 16
corporations even more of an incentive to uphold safety standards in order to keep costs 
as low as possible. Private prison companies are carefully monitored and any bad 
publicity could jeopardize contracts, increase costs, and lower profits, further motivating 
these firms to provide a safe environment for both its staff and inmates. 
 Aside from competing among other private prison firms, these companies also 
compete with prisons operated by state and federal governments. Without private 
companies, one could argue that government operated prisons lack incentive to improve 
the standard in quality regulated under state law. Advocates of privatized corrections are 
!8
 Logan, Charles H. "Well Kept: Comparing Quality of Confinement in Private and Public Prisons." Journal of 15
Criminal Law and Criminology 4th ser. 83.3 Fall (1992): 590-91. - Reproduction of Logan’s Graph.
 Geo Group Lawsuits. Private Corrections Working Group, n.d. Web.
adamant about the benefits that come from innovations in the prison industry. Proponents 
of the private prison industry claim that these qualities make private prisons a good 
option for states looking to lower the cost of incarceration and work within their budgets 
without having to cut back on funding in other areas. 
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III. Common Criticisms of Private Prisons 
!
a. Questionable Incentives 
 One major criticism of private prisons is that they are financially driven to operate at 
full capacity and thus are motivated to put more people behind bars. More so, many 
contracts between private prisons and state/federal governments contain occupancy 
requirements. A recent study conducted by In the Public Interest, a comprehensive 
resource center on privatization and contracting, found that 41 of the 63 contracts 
examined contained occupancy requirements ranging between 80-100% . Also, some 17
people argue that private prison firms have no incentive to keep those currently 
incarcerated out of prison, and therefore lack any incentive to lower the rate of 
recidivism. The former motto of the industry’s largest corporation CCA boasted, “If you 
build it, they will come” . Those against private prisons see this mentality as detrimental 18
to the rehabilitative goals of incarceration and undermine the attempt to lower the 
incarceration rate in the United States.  
 Another heavily criticized aspect of the private prison industry is the amount of 
compensation received by its top executives. In 2010, CCA’s President and CEO and 
GEO Group’s Chairman and CEO were reported to have received more than $3.2 million 
!10
 Criminal: How Lockup Quotas and “Low-Crime Taxes” Guarantee Profits for Private Prison Corporations. 17
Publication. Washington: In the Public Interest, 2013.
 Antonuccio, Rachel. "Prisons for Profit: Do the Social and Political Problems Have a Legal Solution?"18
and $3.5 million in executive compensation respectively . Because government contracts 19
provide the main source of revenue for these companies, those against private prisons 
argue that this is a misuse of taxpayer dollars . These figures cause those against private 20
prisons to further question the incentives of those operating in an already controversial 
industry. 
!
b. Insufficient Evidence of Cost Savings 
 Those skeptical of private prisons are not hesitant to point out the numerous studies 
and reports that indicate private prisons sometimes do not save money and in some cases 
cost more than government operated prisons . State audits from Arizona and Hawaii, 21
along with a report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) claim information 
on projected cost savings were “misleading,” “flawed,” and based on inadequate data . If 22
accurate, this information would discredit the financial incentives of state and federal 
governments to partner with private prison corporations in an effort to save money.  
 The idea that prisons promote economic development is another heavily debated 
issue. Those against private prisons claim that no meaningful number of jobs are created 
in areas where these prisons are being built, and play no major role in the cost-benefit 
analysis of a prison. An analysis of a private prison in Karnes County, Texas projected the 
600-bed facility would create about 140 jobs and $150,000 in tax revenue . With this 23
!11
 Shapiro, David. Banking on Bondage: Private Prisons and Mass Incarceration. 19
 Shapiro, David. Banking on Bondage: Private Prisons and Mass Incarceration. (page 13)20
 Ibid.21
 Ibid.22
 "Who Benefits When A Private Prison Comes To Town?" National Public Radio Nov. 2011. Web.23
prison saving taxpayers of Karnes County such a small amount, one could argue that the 
cost saving and  economic development are both trivial and not worth having a prison in 
your back yard. 
!
c. The Effect of Political Contributions 
 Another major criticism of private prisons is the industry’s effort to lobby for stricter 
laws resulting in longer sentences. A report from the Justice Policy Institute labels this as 
“a three-pronged approach to influencing policy, creating more incarceration, and making 
more money” . While perfectly legal, some argue the large campaign contributions these 24
corporations make through Political Action Committees (PACs) drive policymakers to 
make decisions based on the preferences of campaign donors. 
 However, unlike other negatively viewed aspects of private prisons, many of these 
companies do not hide their attempt to promote stricter laws and harder punishment. In 
CCA’s 2010 annual report, the company addresses this issue by stating, “The demand for 
our facilities and services could be adversely affected by the relaxation of enforcement 
efforts, leniency in conviction or parole standards and sentencing practices or through the 
decriminalization of certain activities that are currently proscribed by our criminal laws”. 
While this may not have any legal implications, those against private prisons question the 
morality of this practice and view it as another example of influences, rather than purely 
economic considerations, driving public policy. 
!
!12
 Ashton, Paul. "Gaming the System: How the Political Strategies of Private Prison Companies Promote 24
Ineffective Incarceration Policies.” (Page 15)
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IV. Justice Reinvestment 
!
a. Support and Evidence of Success 
 In stark contrast to the pro-enforcement, tough on crime approach many states have 
taken in the past, some states are beginning to take a preventative approach using a 
concept known as justice reinvestment. In order to prevent further growth in prison 
populations, these states are investing in community supervision, treatment and diversion 
programs, along with utilizing parole for low-risk offenders. Using this approach, state 
policymakers are working with the Council of State Governments Justice Center, the 
Bureau of Justice Assistance, a component of the U.S. Department of Justice, and the 
Public Safety Performance Project of The Pew Charitable Trusts’ Center on the States 
with hopes of improving public safety while making better use of corrections spending.  
 In the past, many state policymakers have ignored the possibility of crime deterrent 
methods being useful to lower the prison populations. Perhaps afraid of how the public 
would react to lenient laws or going against a campaign promising to be tough on drugs, 
these policymakers have ignored the possibility of using rehabilitation and preventative 
care to lower prison populations. A study from the Bureau of Justice Statistics showed 
that within three years, an estimated 67.5% of inmates were rearrested . While 25
recidivism rates have steadily increased over the years, so have the number of inmates. 
!13
 Langan, Patrick A., and David J. Levin. Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994. Bureau of Justice 25
Statistics. 2002
Between the 1994 study and 2008, the population of inmates being released each year has 
more than doubled; meaning about 461,025 of the 683,000 inmates released in 2008 will 
be rearrested within three years of being released . Studies further confirm the 26
disconcerting reality of what is often called the “revolving door” by showing how time 
spent behind bars has little if any impact on the likelihood of someone returning to 
prison . Perhaps because of these facts, many policymakers have chosen not to reinvest 27
in correction spending and refuse to implement reform. However, the states that have 
chosen to take this route have had an incredible amount of short-term success. 
!
b. Texas 
 Texas, a state notorious for being tough on crime, a leader in both immigration and 
drug reform, and consistently a frontrunner for having the highest incarceration of any 
state in the country, decided in 2007 to work with the CSG Justice Center in order to 
reduce corrections spending and increase public safety. Over a five-year period, the Texas 
prison population was estimated to grow by almost 14,000 prisoners, costing taxpayers an 
estimated $523 million between 2008 and 2009 .  28
 After an analysis of the current prison population, two key issues stood out to those 
contemplating policy reform. First, despite a 3% decrease in the number of parolees, 
there was an 18% increase in those returning to prison based on a violation of parole over 
!14
 "Justice Reinvestment Facts & Trends." Collaborative Approaches to Public Safety. Justice Center: The 26
Council of State Governments, n.d. Web.
 Laudano, Jennifer. Prison Time Served and Recidivism. Rep. N.p.: Public Safety Performance Project, 2013.27
 Justice Reinvestment State Brief: Texas. Rep. New York: Council of State Governments Justice Center, 2007.28
the past decade . Second, over 2,000 people were awaiting placement for substance and 29
mental health programs due to a lack of funding and insufficient number of facilities . 30
Using this information, state policymakers decided to reinvest correction spending to 
focus on these areas instead of simply building a new prison to house the increasing 
number of inmates. While working with the CSG Justice Center, the Texas legislature 
passed a series of bills geared toward helping reduce the number of inmates while 
reinvesting a large portion of the corrections budget. On the next page I have reproduced 
a table providing by the CSG Justice Center which shows the bills passed. 
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 Justice Reinvestment in Texas: Assessing the Impact of the 2007 Justice Reinvestment Initiative. Rep. New 29
York: Council of State Governments Justice Center, April 2009.
 Ibid.30
!
Implementation of the Texas Reinvestment Initiative (2007)  31
  
!16
Program Increase in Funding ($) Description
Probation Outpatient Treatment $10 million Probation outpatient substance abuse 
treatment under contract or by probation 
department
Mental Health Pre-Trial 
Diversion
$10 million Mental health treatment funding dedicated 
to encouraging pre-trial release of mentally 
ill offenders
State Jail Treatment $5.8 million Substance abuse treatment in state jail 
facilities housing low-level property and 
drug offenders
In-Prison Therapeutic 
Community (IPTC)
$21.7 million The program provides intensive substance 
abuse treatment services to offenders in 
prison and post- release. The 6-month in-
prison phase is followed by 3 months in a 
TTC in the community, and 3 to 9 months of 
outpatient counseling. The parole board uses 
the program as a condition for the release of 
offenders who need substance abuse 
treatment.
DWI Prison Treatment $22.2 million A prison facility dedicated to providing 
offenders convicted of DWI offenses with a 
6-month substance abuse treatment program.
Probation Residential Treatment $32.2 million Residential treatment facilities provide 
substance abuse treatment, counseling, and 
rehabilitation services. Programs range from 
3 to 12 months.
Substance Abuse Felony 
Punishment (SAFP)
$63.1 million The program provides intensive residential 
substance abuse treatment services to 
offenders on probation who are violating the 
conditions of their supervision due to 
substance abuse problems. The program 
involves treatment in a secure facility for 6 
months, followed by 3 months in a TTC in 
the community,!
and 3 to 9 months of outpatient counseling. 
This program is also available to parolees, 
but most of the capacity is used for 
probationers.
Intermediate Sanction Facilities 
(ISFs), Parole/Probation
$28.7 million ISFs are secure facilities that serve as 
detention centers for offenders violating the 
conditions of their supervision (“technical 
violations”). These facilities are used to 
sanction offenders in lieu of a revocation to 
prison. The average length of stay is 60 days.
  Source: Justice Reinvestment in Texas: Assessing the Impact of the 2007 Justice Reinvestment  31
 Initiative. Rep. New York: Council of State Governments Justice Center, April 2009.
 With the average inmate in Texas costing taxpayers around $49.50/day , or about 
$18,067 annually, an estimated $262.4 million was saved based on the projected prison 
population in 2012 . Those who support justice reinvestment see this saving as a major 32
step in dealing with overcrowding and helping states make better use of their corrections 
spending. In a state like Texas, with an annual corrections budget of a little over $3 
billion, a $260 million savings goes a long way in helping distribute funds to other areas 
such as education and public health . 33
Texas Prison Population Projected  vs. Actual  (2007-2012)  34 35
!17
 Levin, Marc A. Corrections Budget and Prison Operations. Rep. N.p.: Texas Public Policy Foundation, 2008.32
 Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Fiscal Years 2014-2015 Legislative Appropriations Request.33
 Source: Adult and Juvenile Correctional Population Projections. Rep. N.p.: State of Texas Legislative 34
Budget Board, 2007.
 Source: Prisoners in 2007 - 2012. United States Department of Justice. Bureau of Justice Statistics. Raw 35
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c. Potential Failures 
 While advocates of justice reinvestment give credit to this nuanced approach in 
criminal justice for lowering the prison population, saving taxpayers money, and 
improving public safety, those against this strategy argue that no long-term evidence 
exists to support these trends. Although incarceration rates in the United States have 
continued to decline over the past five years, some opponents suggest that lenient laws 
for low-risk offenders will eventually increase the number of crimes in this area. This 
argument suggests that by lowering the “cost” of committing these crimes, more 
individuals will behave in low-risk criminal activity, therefore increasing the number of 
crimes and off-setting the short term benefits of justice reinvestment.  
 While this may be true, there is not enough long term data to indicate whether or not 
the hundreds of millions of dollars being invested in treatment and diversion programs 
will have any success in deterring this type of criminal activity. However, more and more 
states have begun to take a justice reinvestment approach, indicating that some feel that 
the long-term risks are worth taking in order to deal with the rapidly rising cost of 
incarceration and its impact on state taxpayers. This form of experimental policy, if 
shown to be ineffective, may not be worth the risk to states hoping for a more proven 
solution to overcrowding and the rising costs of incarceration. 
!
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V. California’s Public Safety Realignment 
!
a. About the Act 
 In 2011, the United States Supreme Court ruled that California must reduce its prison 
population by more than 30,000 offenders .  The Supreme Court’s justification for its 36
decision was that overcrowding had led to unconstitutionally poor health care delivery in 
California state prisons . After this ruling, California implemented the Public Safety 37
Realignment Act, transferring jurisdiction and funding for managing low-level criminal 
offenders from the State to the counties. 
 According to California Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. the purpose of the act is to 
eliminate the revolving door for lower-level offenders and parole violators, which 
“wastes money, aggravates crowded conditions, thwarts rehabilitation, and impedes local 
law enforcement supervision” . It is also important to note that under the new laws, 38
those currently in state prison will not be released early and will continue to serve their 
entire sentence.  As part of this act, county-based probation departments began to take 
part in what is called post-release community supervision (PRCS) in order to supervise 
!19
 Brown v. Plata. Supreme Court (2011)36
 Grattet, Ryken, and Joseph Hayes. California's Changing Prison Population. Publication. N.p.: Public Policy 37
Institute of California, 2013.
 Governor Brown Signs Legislation to Improve Public Safety and Empower Local Law Enforcement. Office of 38
non-violent, non-serious, non-sex registrant offenders being released from prison . 39
Under this act, which became effective in October of 2011, these “non-non-non” 
offenders may now be sentenced to county jail and/or alternative custody programs 
instead of State prison .  40
!
b. Short-Term Success 
 In a report demonstrating the effects of realignment, the California Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation found under previous state law 32.4% of prisoners 
returned for a new term in the year prior to the Realignment Act, while in the year 
following its implementation, a little over 7% of offenders returned to state prison within 
one year . This drastic decrease is more than likely due to the large number of inmates 41
who are re-incarcerated due to violations of parole, which no longer constitutes a return 
to state prison. This drop in prisoners not only saves taxpayers money by lowering the 
number of state funded prisoners, but also opens up beds for serious and/or violent 
offenders. 
 In the two years following the implementation of the Realignment Act, the California 
prison population had already met its 30,000 goal. In 2010 the estimated 164,213 inmates 
in California fell to 134,211 at the end of 2012 . California’s reduction of about 15,000 42
!20
 Realignment Report: An Examination of Offenders Released from State Prison in the First Year of Public 39
Safety Realignment. Rep. N.p.: California Department of Corrections And Rehabilitation, 2013.
 Realignment Report: An Examination of Offenders Released from State Prison in the First Year of Public 40
Safety Realignment.
 Ibid.41
 Prisoners in 2012 - Advance Counts. By E. Ann Carson and Daniela Golinelli42
inmates between 2011 and 2012 accounts for almost half of the entire reduction in the 
United States prison population. With an average annual cost of $47,421 per inmate, this 
drop in state-held prisoners saved California an estimated $702.5 million in 2012 . For 43
many, these numbers demonstrate the effectiveness of the Realignment Act in reducing 
the inmate population, improving the medical attention and environment of inmates, 
while also helping eliminate wasteful corrections spending in order to save taxpayers 
money. 
!
California State Prison Population Before and After Realignment (2005-2012)  44
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 Source: Prisoners in 2012 - Advance Counts. By E. Ann Carson and Daniela Golinelli. Note: dotted line 44
indicates when realignment took effect in California.
c. Criticisms and Long-Term Implications 
 In the recent years following the Realignment Act, those against the change in policy 
have argued that it has led to increasing crime in California. Using the FBI crime 
statistics released at the end of 2012, those against the Realignment Act argue that 
California has suffered an increase in violent and property crimes following its 
implementation. Data indicates that 40 of California’s 69 largest cities suffered an 
increase in crime during the first six months of 2012, which some argue is a direct result 
of the Realignment Act . On the other side, supporters argue that violent crime rates 45
dropped in the five counties that received the majority of lower-level offenders who 
would have otherwise gone to state prison . 46
  However, with no long-term evidence available to support either side, it is 
impossible to make an accurate assessment of the policy’s consequences in terms of 
public safety. This policy approach is somewhat of an experiment, and those against the 
act argue the risk is not worth the reward. Being that there are a limited number of 
alternatives for lowering the state prison population, some states may be willing to take 
on the long-term risks in order to see the immediate results. With only one example of a 
state taking this approach (California), others may be unwilling to realign their prison 
population in order to save on the increasing cost to state taxpayers. 
!
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V. Mississippi Justice Policy 
!
a. Mississippi vs. United States Facts 
 Before examining the justice policy in Mississippi, it is important to analyze the 
current economic and social condition of the state. Using information from the US 
Census and Mississippi State Expenditure Report, I have developed a list of statistical 
information that compares Mississippi to national averages in areas such as education, 
employment and public assistance.  
 Currently, an estimated 22.3% of the Mississippi population live below the poverty 
level, compared to a 14.9% national average . In terms of education, while  81% of the 47
population over the age of 25 has graduated from high school (only 5% below the 
national average), only 20% of the states’ population has earned a bachelor’s degree or 
higher, which is 8.5% below the national average . The state also has an estimated 48
unemployment rate of 8%, ranking Mississippi 44th among all US states . Mississippi is 49
also known for having the second highest incarceration rate in the country, with an 
estimated 22,319 of its 2.9 million people being held under state jurisdiction . 50
Collectively, these figures not only burden the national reputation of the state, but 
jeopardize the safety and well-being of the states’ almost 3 million inhabitants. 
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b. Mississippi State Budget, Corrections Spending and Prison Conditions 
 Since 1990, the number of prisoners being held in Mississippi has almost tripled . 53
Because of this, those governing Mississippi have been faced with difficult decisions on 
how and where to increase spending on corrections. In the eight years between 2005 and 
2013, Mississippi’s appropriation towards corrections has increased by an estimated $95 
million, while the funds used toward education have fallen by almost 4% . This large 54
portion of state funds being used on corrections has continued to rise over the recent 
years, ranking Mississippi seventh in 2011 among all southern states in terms of 
percentage of budget spent on state corrections . 55
 Despite Mississippi’s significant spending on corrections, most of this money goes 
toward constructing and operating prisons. A study released by the Pew Charitable Trusts 
shows that only 7% of the total corrections budget in Mississippi supports community 
supervision for the nearly 40,000 felony offenders on probation, parole, and house 
arrest . Because of this, the majority of Mississippi state prisons lack important 56
programs to help inmates with being reintroduced into society and/or stay out of prison. 
Only seven of Mississippi’s prisons have English as a Second Language (ESL) program, 
while only three offer their inmates Special Education classes . A mere 35% of prisons 57
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offer job-seeking counseling compared to a 73% national average and only about 26% of 
these prisons have parenting and child rearing programs, which is almost half of the 
national average . Perhaps because of this, the cost per prisoner in Mississippi is only 58
$41.74/day, and is considered to be the lowest in the United States . 59
 Mississippi Inmate Population (1990 - 2013)  60
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c. Mandatory Minimums and Low-Risk Criminals 
 Some argue that one reason for Mississippi’s high rate of incarceration stems from 
what are some of the country’s most severe drug laws. While the average state prison 
sentence for drug sales in the United States is 5.7 years, Mississippi’s is an average of 
10.4 years . Also, Mississippi’s 7.2 year average sentence for drug possession is almost 3 61
years longer than the national average of only 4.5 years . These alarming figures are in 62
part due to Mandatory Minimum Laws, which give judges a limited amount of discretion 
when determining the length of a sentence. As a result of these laws, activist groups such 
as Families Against Mandatory Minimums (FAMM) have begun to speak out in an 
attempt to change the current laws for low-risk drug offenders. 
 The large number of property-type offenders incarcerated in Mississippi is also an 
area of concern. Currently, Mississippi’s property offense statutes do not distinguish 
between large ranges of theft. This issue was addressed at the end of 2013 by 
Mississippi’s Corrections and Criminal Justice Task Force, which recommended that the 
state differentiate levels of property crime . This group pointed out that currently a theft 63
of $2,000 can result in the same sentence as a theft of $50,000 . With the current 64
threshold for felony property crimes at $500, the large percentage of non-violent, low-
risk, offenders currently incarcerated in Mississippi for property crimes is likely to stay as 
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is. Despite crime rates for property-type offenses continuing to fall, almost 30% of the 
current prison population is filled with property-type offenders.  
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VI. Privatize, Reinvest, or Realign in Mississippi? 
!
a. Private Prisons in Mississippi 
 According to data provided by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), Mississippi 
prisons are currently operating at a mere 64% of their operational capacity . In 2011, 65
Mississippi held the second lowest occupancy rate among all states, having room for 
almost an additional 10,000 prisoners. With many states operating at full-capacity and 
some such as California and Delaware exceeding operational capacity, this small victory 
for Mississippi means that overcrowding in state-level correctional facilities is not likely 
to occur any time soon . Thus, it is unlikely that more private prisons will need to be 66
constructed in the state of Mississippi in the near future. However, with the prison 
population in Mississippi rising year after year and the switch to private prisons being 
one possible solution, it is important to look at the potential cost savings per prisoner 
experienced in this state. 
 Using data provided by the Mississippi Department of Corrections , I have 67
calculated the estimated differences in costs per prisoner that has resulted from the use of 
private facilities. In this analysis, I am assuming that private prisons have no impact on 
the prison population and also that capital costs are equal among private and public 
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operations (although, as stated earlier, they are likely less for private companies). The 
purpose of this analysis is to see whether or not savings on operating costs are 
experienced in the private prison sector, thus justifying the “cost savings” argument made 
by those advocating for the use of private prisons. It is also important to note that inmate 
population has a significant effect on operating costs. While private prisons in Mississippi 
today hold about 4,600 prisoners, the three largest public prisons shown here only hold a 
little over 3,000. 
!
 Private vs. Public Cost Per Prisoner Per Day (2000-2012)  68
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 Source: Mississippi Department of Corrections Cost Per Inmate Day by Facility Type (FY 2000-2012). N.d.68
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 As you can see from the graph, average operating costs for private prisons are 
significantly less than the operating costs experienced at the Mississippi State 
Penitentiary (MSP). However, between 2000 and 20004, a significant number of 
prisoners were taken out of the MSP, Central MS Correctional Facility (CMCF), and the 
South MS Correctional Institution (SMCI)  and placed in private prisons, allowing all 
three of these prisons to operate below full-capacity and thus at a lower cost. However, 
the MSP’s costs have continued to rise since 2005, as the inmate population continues to 
grow. On the other side, the privately operated prisons consist of multiple facilities 
housing over 1,000 inmates and are able to operate at a lower cost while housing a 
significant number of inmates. Looking at 2008, a year when the private prisons, CMCF 
and SMCI all had a comparable cost per prisoner, the private prisons held over 4,800 
inmates while the CMCF had 3,558 and the SMCI housed only 2,980 . In the same year, 69
the MSP housed 500 less prisoners than the private prisons, but spent about $5,850 more 
per year ($16/day) on each prisoner . 70
 Allowing the three largest public state prisons in Mississippi to operate below full-
capacity in order to keep costs low seems to indicate that private prisons have provided a 
short-term solution to Mississippi’s problem with overcrowding back in the mid 1990s. 
The ability of private prisons to house more inmates at a lower or equal cost, indicates 
that from a purely financial perspective, private prisons could potentially be used as a 
cost-saving mechanism in this state. However, as the prison population continues to rise, 
in the long run, the operating costs of both public and private facilities will inevitably rise 
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and while private facilities may be able to operate at a lower cost to the taxpayers in the 
short run, they do not provide a permanent, cost-saving, solution. 
 More so, in the past few years, lawsuits against private prison companies in 
Mississippi have lowered the interest of some private companies. In 2012, Geo-Group, 
the nation’s second largest private prison corporation, cancelled all three of its contracts 
in Mississippi. This decision came shortly after a lawsuit brought by the Southern 
Poverty Law Center and the ACLU, citing the poor conditions and lack of accountability 
for both civil and criminal wrongdoings at the Walnut Grove Youth Correctional Facility 
(WGYCF) . The companies’ CEO, George Zoley, claimed that the reason for terminating 71
the contracts in Mississippi were because the prisons were “financially 
underperforming” . However, the timing of the decision may lead some to believe that 72
the lawsuit and large settlement that followed were at least part of Geo Group’s decision 
to abandon its contracts in Mississippi. Although a new private contractor, Management 
and Training Corporation (MTC) quickly took over the contract from Geo Group, it will 
be interesting to see if they can continue to operate at a low cost, despite the negative 
publicity and impact of the lawsuit. 
!
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b. Reinvesting Corrections Budget to Fund Drug Courts 
 For the 2015 fiscal year, Mississippi Governor Phil Bryant recommended about $366 
million should be allocated to the MDOC in order to fund its current operations . This is 73
an 8.3% increase from the previous year and represents a little over  6% of the state’s 
entire budget. While 6% may not initially seem like a large portion, when compared to 
areas such as Economic Development and Rehabilitation Services which receive 0.38% 
and 0.41% respectively, this figure stands out .  74
 The increase in funds being allocated to corrections is unquestionably due to the 
increase in the states’ prison population, which increased from an estimated 13,000 
prisoners in 1996 to almost 22,000 in 2012. Not only does this increase in prisoners cause 
operating costs to rise, but also means that more prisons (either private or public) must be 
built in order to keep current prisons operating below full-capacity. While costs and 
inmate admissions have continued to go up in Mississippi, it is important to note that 
crime rates have actually gone down. Since 1996, property, burglary, larceny, aggravated 
assault, robbery, and violent crimes have all fallen, while the murder and rape rates have 
remained roughly the same. The two graphs shown on page 35 demonstrate this 
surprising trend and bring up questions as to why the costs of incarceration have gone up 
rather than down.  
 This data offers two opposing explanations for why more prisoners are being held in 
Mississippi. On one side, more prisoners being locked up means less offenders are free to 
commit these crimes, thus explaining the fall in crime rates. This argument is further 
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justified by the decrease in the overall percentage of inmate admissions coming from 
these specific categories. For instance, in 2001 6.35% of inmate admissions came from 
robbery, compared to only 5.36% in 2012. Another example that supports this theory is 
violent crime admissions, which fell from 5.89% in 2001 to 2.88% in 2012. With crime 
rates in all of these areas dropping, the increase in prison population could be at least 
partially due to the increased number of individuals being arrested for drug-related 
offenses, specifically possession. The graph on page 36 shows that despite arrests for 
drug sales being fairly static, possession arrests have increased by almost 37% in the past 
decade. 
 This theory is also supported by the fact that sentence lengths for drug-related 
offenses have increased significantly in the past decade. Longer sentences mean that 
drug-related offenders occupy more beds for an extended period of time, leaving less 
room for violent and/or serious offenders, while also increasing the long-term costs 
imposed on state taxpayers. The graph at the bottom of page 36 shows how the average 
sentencing length for drug-offenders has increased since 2003, adding support to this 
theory and helping explain why almost 1/3 of the prison population in Mississippi 
consists of drug-related offenders . 75
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Property Crime Rates in Mississippi (1996-2012)  76
   Violent Crime Rates in Mississippi (1996-2012)  77
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 While this explanation for the increase in Mississippi’s state prison population is 
plausible, it is important to consider the potential flaws. The increased number of drug 
related offenders could have a casual relationship with the decline in other categories of 
crime admissions (violent, robbery, etc.). One could argue that the number of criminals 
committing theft, assault, etc. is lowered because individuals committing these crimes for 
the purpose of supporting a drug addiction are in prison for a drug-related offense. Thus, 
keeping more people locked up for drug-related crimes is important in order to ensure 
low crime rates in other areas. If the number of admissions and sentences was lowered, 
this could result in higher admissions in other categories, thus negating any cost benefit. 
The alternative theory for the rise in prison population is that the number of actual drug-
related crimes has increased in this time, and that the number of admissions and longer 
sentences are merely the state dealing with a significant increase in drug-related criminal 
activity. 
 Drug Courts are one solution that Mississippi and other states across the country are 
using to deal with the large number of drug offenders. These courts provide an alternative 
method to incarceration for individuals convicted of drug-related charges and those who 
committed a crime as a direct result of substance abuse. The first felony adult Drug Court 
in Mississippi opened in 1999, but until recently growth had been relatively slow. 
Between 2004 and 2010, the number of Drug Court participants went from 637 to an 
estimated 2,800 .    Drug courts provide education and training programs dealing with 80
substance abuse, custom designed treatment programs, supervision of participants 
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including drug tests, and other ways to deal with addiction. As policymakers in 
Mississippi look at alternatives to incarceration, Drug Courts stand out as a way to 
promote rehabilitation, while keeping public safety as a top priority. 
 In addition to the rehabilitative benefits of Drug Courts, there are also cost savings. 
Currently, thirty eight Drug Courts operate in Mississippi, and are estimated to save $32 
million annually in incarceration costs along with $54 million annually on health care 
costs . In 2010, the estimated annual cost per inmate in Mississippi was about $15,235 81
per year, while it costs less than $2,000 annually to intensely supervise a Drug Court 
participant . Despite the savings from this system, only $4 million of the current budget 82
is being allocated to fund Drug Courts in Mississippi . Those advocating for the use of 83
Drug Courts claim that the recent growth of drug courts in Mississippi has outpaced their 
funding and without increased funding this system is in jeopardy of being less effective 
or potentially shut down.  
 In order to test the effectiveness of the Drug Court system in Mississippi, I examined 
the number of drug-related offenses in counties where drug courts are being used as an 
alternative method to incarceration. Economic theory tells us that a criminal will commit 
a crime where the marginal cost (potential of getting caught, fear of punishment, lost 
earnings, etc.) equals the marginal benefit (getting high, etc.). By providing an alternative 
method to incarceration, the “cost” of committing the drug-related crime is lower. Thus, 
the number of drug-related crimes being committed in these areas will increase.  Under 
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this theory there are three basic assumptions. First, those committing drug-related 
offenses in these counties are aware of the implementation of Drug Courts, that they 
could be eligible, and that they are used as an alternative to incarceration. Second, that 
the majority of these criminals would prefer the Drug Court program instead of 
incarceration. Third, the benefit of committing drug-related crimes has not increased or 
decreased since the enactment of drug courts. 
 For this analysis, I tested three types of areas to see the impact of Drug Courts on the 
percentage of drug-related admissions relative to overall admissions. The different areas 
included areas with a large number of both overall and drug admissions, areas with a 
relatively small number of overall and drug admissions, and areas without Drug Courts 
operating in their jurisdiction. The area with a large number of admissions includes the 
7th Circuit (Hinds County), the 14th Circuit (Lincoln, Pike, and Walthall Counties), and 
the 19th Circuit (George, Green, and Jackson Counties). The area with relatively low 
admissions includes the 4th Circuit (Leflore, Sunflower, and Washington Counties), the 
9th Circuit (Issaquena, Sharkey, and Warren Counties), and the 21st Circuit (Holmes, 
Humphreys, and Yazoo Counties). For the last type, consisting of areas without Drug 
Court jurisdiction, I created three “Circuits,” naming them X Circuit (Jefferson, 
Claiborne, and Copiah Counties), Y Circuit (Smith, Jasper, and Jones Counties), and Z 
Circuit (Grenada, Carroll, and Montgomery Counties). With populations and admissions 
extremely low in jurisdictions lacking Drug Courts, I combined three counties in similar 
regions (West, South, and North, respectively) into circuits in order to make this data 
more accurate. To test the effect of Drug Courts, drug-related admissions as a percent of 
!39
total admissions was regressed on a constant and a linear time trend for the years 
2003-2012. Because the MDOC only has county-specific information from 2003-2012, 
only this information was used in the test.  
 If the Drug Courts are effective as preventative policy, we might expect to see a 
decrease in drug-related admissions as a percentage of overall admissions. If drug-related 
admissions are relatively stable, the system could also be viewed as effective, as the 
additional criminals are being put through the Drug Court system at a lower cost, as 
opposed to being incarcerated. Alternatively, if the Drug Courts are lowering the cost of 
committing the drug-related crime and are thus ineffective in preventing drug-related 
crimes, we would expect to see an increase in drug-related admissions relative to overall 
admissions in areas with Drug Court jurisdiction. The three Circuits lacking Drug Court 
jurisdiction (X, Y, and Z) will be used as comparison, but are predicted to be relatively 
stable as they have presumably not been impacted by the Drug Court policy. 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!40
Change in Drug Admissions Relative to Total Admissions for Large, Small, and Non-
Drug Court Circuits (2003-2012)  84!
Circuit Average Annual Percentage 
Point Change in Drug 
Admissions as a Percentage of 
Total Admissions
            T-Stat
4th (Small) -0.6 -1.66
9th (Small) -0.5 -1.05
21st (Small) -0.3 -0.45
7th (Large) -1.4* -5.71
14th (Large) 0.07 0.22
19th (Large) 0.6* 2.46
X (Non-Drug Court) -2* -2.95
Y (Non-Drug Court) -0.7 -1.30
Z (Non-Drug Court) 0.4 0.85
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Research & Evaluation Division, n.d. Web. 
Note - For each circuit, drug-related admissions as a percent of total admissions was regressed on a constant 
and a linear time trend for the years 2003-2012.  The coefficient on the time trend for each circuit court 
regression is shown above. * represents statistically significant results.
 Looking at the results, it appears that Drug Courts had little effect on decreasing the 
number of drug-related admissions as a percentage of total admissions in the large 
counties. While the 7th Circuit (Hinds County), saw an average annual decrease of 1.4 
percentage points in drug-related admissions as a percent of total admissions, it was the 
only Circuit with two functioning Drug Courts. The “small” circuits were the only type of 
area in which all three showed a decline, despite being relatively minor. Information from 
the non-Drug Court circuits supports the view that Drug Courts had little if any impact on 
the number of drug-related admissions in most of the circuits tested. Overall, the Drug 
Courts did not seem to decrease the “cost” of committing drug related crimes, nor has it 
had a significant effect on lowering the number of drug-related admissions relative to 
overall admissions. However, with an estimated 2,800 active participants in the Drug 
Court system who would otherwise be admitted into prison, the use of Drug Courts as a 
cost saving mechanism has proven effective. 
 The average ratio of drug-related admissions to overall admissions in these counties, 
falling between 35-40%, also reflects the highly concentrated drug-related inmate 
population in Mississippi. While the percentage of drug-related inmates in all US state 
prisons is 16.8%, Mississippi’s prison population is filled with 28.2% drug-related 
offenders. The disparity in property crimes is also surprising, with the US state prison 
average at about 18.2% and Mississippi’s at an estimated 30.3%. The large number of 
drug and property inmates in Mississippi could perhaps be connected, with many 
burglary and larceny crimes possibly being committed to fund a drug addiction. Using 
Drug Courts as an alternative to incarceration provides addicts with a chance to 
!42
rehabilitate, while lowering the chance of recidivism. Reinvesting in Drug Courts will 
also save taxpayers money, costing an estimated $5.48/day as opposed to $41.74/day to 
incarcerate an individual in Mississippi .  85
  US State Prison Population    Mississippi State Prison Population  86 87
!
 While examining MDOC’s data on drug-related admissions for 2013, it became 
apparent that several counties occupy a large percentage of the total drug-related 
admissions in Mississippi. The graph on page 45 shows the uneven distribution of drug-
related admissions across Mississippi and points out the areas where drug-related 
criminal activity (based on admissions) seems to be most prevalent in this state. 
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 In 2013, four counties (Harrison, Jackson, Rankin, and DeSoto), were responsible for 
26.8% of drug-related admissions in Mississippi. With such a large percentage of drug-
related admissions coming from these counties, reinvesting in rehabilitation centers, 
substance and drug abuse education programs, and Drug Courts in these areas could go a 
long way toward reducing the overall number of drug-related inmates in Mississippi. By 
targeting the areas with the highest concentration of drug-related admissions, Mississippi 
could test the effectiveness of using rehabilitation, drug awareness/education programs, 
and heavily-funded Drug Courts to help address these problems. Making an effort to use 
corrections funds more efficiently is the first step Mississippi must take in order to limit 
the number of non-violent, low-risk, offenders being incarcerated in this state. The cost of 
imprisonment to house drug-related offenders is too high, and  if the goal is to eliminate 
drug-use and/or drug distribution, a preventative approach might be more effective than 
the tough on drugs method that has failed in the past. 
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   Drug-Related Admissions Across All Counties in Mississippi  88
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 Source: 2013 Annual Report. Rep. Mississippi Department of Corrections: Policy, Planning, Research & 88
Evaluation Division, n.d.
c. Why Realignment Won’t Work in Mississippi 
 The success of Public Safety Realignment in California, despite being a significant 
accomplishment for the state, relied on having a large number of county jails and also 
empty space in these facilities available to house additional inmates. With state-level 
facilities being overcrowded, California took low-risk offenders and placed them under 
county supervision. By realigning its inmates and taking advantage of the space available 
in county-level facilities, California seems to have made progress on its goal to improve 
the living conditions of its inmates, reduce the effect of the revolving door, and save on 
the high costs of incarceration. 
 However, in order for this approach to work in Mississippi or any other state there 
must be room in county-level facilities. As of March 3, 2014 county-level correctional 
facilities in Mississippi are operating at almost 98% capacity, with room for less than 100 
inmates . More so, Mississippi’s state prisons are operating at just over 82% capacity 89
and its private prisons at about 73% capacity . Because of this information, it would not 90
make sense for Mississippi to realign its inmates in order to save on costs and/or improve 
the living conditions of its inmates. If anything (assuming incarceration is the only 
option), Mississippi should take inmates out of regional facilities to reduce overcrowding 
in these facilities and place them in private or state-level prisons. This would reduce 
operating costs at the county-level and presumably improve the living conditions of 
inmates in these facilities. More so, based on data from the MDOC, it is actually cheaper 
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to house an inmate in a private prison than in a county facility, making realigning inmates 
from state to county facilities even less practical for Mississippi .  91
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VII. Conclusion 
!
 While considering the arguments for and against the use of private prisons there is no 
clear winner. Those opposed to private prisons rely primarily on attacking the incentives 
of those operating within the industry and their disincentive to address recidivism. At the 
same time, evidence exists that shows private prisons as cost-effective in some states, but 
not in others. Justice reinvestment, while perhaps the most risky of the three approaches, 
has proven in the short-term to be extremely rewarding. Looking at correction spending 
from a bipartisan, data-driven, perspective not only reduces inefficient spending, but 
lowers the opportunity cost that comes with having a significant number of potential 
workers and taxpaying citizens behind bars. Lastly, Public Safety Realignment, while 
successful in California, is not a viable option for states lacking room in county-level 
facilities and appears to serve as a temporary solution to overcrowded state facilities 
rather than helping reduce the actual number of low-risk offenders in the system. 
 Of the three approaches, justice reinvestment seems to be a good fit for Mississippi. 
In a state with a significant number of low-risk offenders, this route could help eliminate 
the revolving door for drug and property offenders, while focusing more on criminals 
who pose a significant threat to public safety. Investing more in Drug Courts, by either 
expanding existing courts or adding more in counties with the most drug-related crimes, 
could reduce the number of low-risk, non-violent, inmates being admitted for drug and 
property crimes by providing a cheaper and more effective form of discipline. 
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Reconsidering Mandatory Minimum Laws and redefining the levels of property offenses, 
while focusing on rehabilitation and lowering recidivism, would also increase capacity 
for violent offenders and allow the state to promote spending in underfunded areas such 
as economic development and education. Although this approach lacks long term 
empirical evidence of success, Mississippi can simply not afford to continue incarcerating 
such a high number of individuals whose primary threat is to themselves and not the 
safety of others.  
 While private prisons appear to be cost effective in Mississippi and allow state 
prisons to operate under capacity, they do not provide a solution to help lower the 
incarceration rate. More so, with GEO Group’s recent decision to eliminate its contracts 
in Mississippi, it is uncertain whether or not others in this industry will want to operate in 
this state if the prisons are proven to be financially underperforming. With hardly any 
available beds at the county-level, realignment is not a viable option for the state of 
Mississippi. While understanding that none of these options will completely solve the 
financial and social burdens of imprisonment, I believe that looking at ways to lessen its 
effect is a major step Mississippi must take to deal with the rising cost of incarceration. 
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